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1  Introduction
Barkhuizen v Napier1 concerns a short-term insurance policy, concluded 
between the appellant (the insured) and a Lloyds syndicate (the insurer), 
represented by the respondent. The insured suffered loss resulting from 
 damage to his 1999 BMW 328i on 2 December 1999. He duly claimed 
R181 000 representing the sum insured on the policy. On 7 January 2000 
the respondent repudiated the claim on the basis that cover was provided for 
private use of the vehicle, but that the loss was suffered while it was being 
utilized for business purposes.2 The insured only instituted action more than 
two years after repudiation, on 8 January 2002.
The summons was met with a special plea alleging that the insurer had 
been released from liability because of a time-limitation clause in the policy. 
The clause was to the effect that a claim of the insured would lapse if he 
failed to serve summons on the insurer within 90 days of being notified of the 
insurer’s repudiation of the claim. The insured conceded non-compliance with 
the clause, but contended that the provision could not be enforced against him 
because it contravened the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
(“the Constitution”). The question was whether the court could impugn the 
time-limitation clause. The parties agreed to a terse statement of facts which 
set out this basic factual matrix.
Time-limitation or time-bar clauses have come before courts often enough. 
Technically, they are resolutive conditions. They extinguish claims upon non-
compliance.3 In some cases the courts have given effect to these clauses,4 
while in others they interpreted time-bar provisions restrictively and have 
* I gratefully acknowledge the valuable advice of Andre van der Walt, Lourens du Plessis, Durand Cupido 
and the anonymous reviewers  
1 2007 5 SA 323 (CC)
2 Paras 2, 182
3 Reinecke, Van der Merwe, Van Niekerk & Havenga General Principles of Insurance Law 2 ed (2002) para 
318
4 Bierman v Mutual & Federal Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk 2004 1 SA 205 (A); Santam Insurance Ltd v 
Cave t/a The Entertainers and the Record Box 1986 2 SA 48 (A); Smit v Rondalia Versekeringskorporasie 
van Suid Afrika Bpk 1964 3 SA 338 (A)
found them not to be applicable on the facts.5 For some years there have been 
rumblings that time-bar clauses could be unconstitutional,6 but the issue came 
before court for the first time in the Napier case.
The court of first instance, per De Villiers J, initially found in favour of 
the insured.7 The Supreme Court of Appeal overturned this decision in a 
unanimous judgment delivered by Cameron JA.8 Thereafter, Ngcobo J for 
the majority in the Constitutional Court (Madala J, Nkabinde J, Skweyiya 
J, Van der Westhuizen J and yacoob J) upheld the decision of the Supreme 
Court of Appeal.9 Two separate concurring judgments were handed down by 
Langa CJ and O’Regan J, while two powerful dissenting judgments emanated 
from the pens of Moseneke DCJ (Mokgoro J concurring) and Sachs J.
2  The application of the Constitution to contracts and the law of 
contract according to Napier
The insured initially contended that the time-limitation provision was 
contrary to public policy as it prescribed an unreasonably short time for insti-
tuting action and was inconsistent with the right of the insured to seek the 
assistance of the court. Furthermore, the insured relied directly on section 34 
of the Constitution which provides that:
“Everyone has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the application of law decided in 
a fair public hearing before a court or, where appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal 
or forum”.10
In the court of first instance the insured ultimately preferred to rely directly 
on the Constitution and not on the argument that the time limitation offended 
against public policy.11
Uncertainty existed as to whether the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa Act 200 of 1993 (“the Interim Constitution”) only engaged relation-
ships that also involved the state, and therefore applied vertically, or whether 
it also applied horizontally, meaning that it also concerned relationships that 
did not involve the state. According to De Villiers J the (final) Constitution 
resolved these uncertainties. The Constitution now applies to all law, which 
includes contract law, and the judiciary is bound to apply the Constitution 
5 IGI Insurance Co Ltd v Madasa 1995 1 SA 144 (TkA); Pereira v Marine and Trade insurance Co Ltd 1975 
4 SA 745 (A); Smith v Santam Bpk 1996 2 SA 334 (O)  See also the discussion in Cape Town Municipality 
v Allianz Insurance Co Ltd 1990 1 SA 311 (C)
6 Hopkins “Insurance Policies and the Bill of Rights: rethinking the Sanctity of Contract Paradigm” 2002 
SALJ 155 and “The influence of the Bill of Rights on the enforcement of Contracts” 2003 De Rebus 22; 
Reinecke et al General Principles of Insurance Law para 318
7 Barkhuizen v Napier TPD 17-09-2004 case no 33129/01 http://www osall org za/docs/Hotdocs/
Barkhuizen_v_Napier_TPD_Sept2004 pdf (accessed 02-10-2008) References will be to pages as set out 
in the pdf version of this case
8 Napier v Barkhuizen 2006 4 SA 1 (SCA)
9 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC)
10 Para 5  The summary of Cameron JA in Napier v Barkhuizen 2006 4 SA 1 (SCA) para 2 is somewhat 
confusing  He starts off by saying that the insured invoked the Constitution  But he then seems to suggest 
that the insured submitted that (i) the limitation was against the public interest because it offended against 
the common law right to invoke the courts and (ii) that he relied on s 34 of Constitution  
11 Barkhuizen v Napier TPD 17-09-2004 case no 33129/01 5  This was addressed on the papers before court 
in Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 8  
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in this manner.12 The judge then determined whether the Constitution was 
applicable in the circumstances. He relied on section 8(2) of the Constitution 
which determines that
“[a] provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic person if, and to the extent that, it 
is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the nature of any duty imposed by the 
right”.
After considering the nature of the right set out in section 34 and the duties 
imposed by the right, he accepted that section 34 was applicable to the time-
limitation provision. The judge then applied section 8(3)(a).13 The relevant 
provisions read as follows:
“When applying a provision of the Bill of Rights to a natural or juristic person in terms of subsection 
(2), a court –
(a)  in order to give effect to a right in the Bill, must apply, or if necessary develop, the common law 
to the extent that legislation does not give effect to that right …”.
No legislation applied in this situation and the common law only gave effect 
to the contract. The common law had to be developed to give effect to the 
Constitution. For this purpose the judge also relied on section 39(2):
“When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or customary law, every 
court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights”.14
An appropriate remedy could then be crafted in accordance with section 
38.15
De Villiers J then turned to the limitation of the right. He assumed that 
a contract could not be judged against specific constitutional rights without 
any qualification. But on what basis could constitutional rights be qualified in 
these circumstances? The limitations clause, section 36, determines that:
“(1)  The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application to the 
extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based 
on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors …”.
This provision only allows limitation in terms of a law of general appli-
cation. At first glance the contractual provision did not appear to be such a 
provision. This obstacle was surmounted by attaching a wide interpretation 
to the expression “law of general application” and by relying on the maxim 
of pacta sunt servanda in the context of the time-limitation clause. The judge 
stated that “[i]n casu sou die ‘algemeen geldende regsvoorskrif’ wees dat ’n 
ooreenkoms bindend is”,16 but in his analysis of section 36 he seems to have 
thought that this argument transforms the contractual clause itself into a law 
of general application.17
12 Barkhuizen v Napier TPD 17-09-2004 case no 33129/01 8 with apparent reference to s 8(1)
13 9
14 De Villiers J stated that the values in s 39(1)(a) had to be promoted in the process (Barkhuizen v Napier 
TPD 17-09-2004 case no 33129/01 10)
15 10
16 13 (“In casu the ‘law of general application’ would be that an agreement is binding”)
17 See especially 17 where he concluded that “[d]ie verweerder … nie sy plig gekwyt het om te toon dat die 
ooreenkoms vervat in klousule 5 2 5 ’n redelike regverdigbare beperking van die eiser se reg op toegang 
tot die hof is nie” (“the defendant … has not acquitted itself of the duty to show that the agreement set out 
in clause 5 2 5 is a reasonably justifiable limitation of the right of the plaintiff of access to the court”)
392 STELL LR 2008 3
The court further found that it could declare a contractual provision 
invalid if it contravened the Constitution, on the basis that section 172(1)(a) 
obliged it to “declare that any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the 
Constitution is invalid to the extent of its inconsistency”. De Villiers J relied 
on his previous conclusion that the time limitation was a law in the wider 
sense. He then declared the provision to be void for being inconsistent with 
the Constitution.18
In the Supreme Court of Appeal, Cameron JA stated that the crisp 
question was: “are time-bar clauses in short-term insurance contracts 
unconstitutional”?19 The judgment of the court a quo was interpreted as rais-
ing two questions. The first concerned the extent to which the Constitution 
applied between contracting parties. The second was whether a time-bar pro-
vision could be rendered unconstitutional in accordance with section 34.20 
The second question was then answered by finding that the specific right 
guaranteed in section 34 could not justify striking down the disputed time 
limitation in the particular case.21
On the first question, Cameron JA accepted the broad correctness of the 
“general premise” expressed in the court a quo that “contractual terms are 
subject to constitutional rights”.22 He justified his support for this proposition 
with reference to his concurring judgment in Brisley v Drotsky.23 There he 
had confirmed that the law in general and the law of contract in particular are 
subject to the Bill of Rights and that fundamental constitutional values had to 
be taken into account in developing contract law. But he followed this broad 
statement with the narrower conclusion that being subject to the Constitution 
means that
“… courts are obliged to take fundamental constitutional values into account while performing their 
duty to develop the law of contract in accordance with the Constitution”.24
Cameron JA then relied on Brisley for the proposition that public policy 
had to be derived from founding constitutional values and that a court will 
invalidate a contract that offends against public policy.25 He then concluded 
that such a constitutional challenge failed in this case for lack of proof.26
Ngcobo J, writing for the majority in the Constitutional Court, remarked that 
the insured had conflated two different arguments. He relied on section 34 as a 
reflection of public policy but also asked the court to apply section 34 directly 
18 17  A general summary of these arguments can be found in Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) paras 
9-10
19 Napier v Barkhuizen 2006 4 SA 1 (SCA) para 1  See also the discussion of Bhana “The Law of Contract 
and the Constitution: Napier v Barkhuizen (SCA)” 2007 SALJ 269
20 Napier v Barkhuizen 2006 4 SA 1 (SCA) para 5
21 Para 17ff (discussed in 3 below)
22 Para 6
23 Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA) paras 88-95 with reference to ss 2, 8(1) and 39(2) of the 
Constitution
24 Napier v Barkhuizen 2006 4 SA 1 (SCA) para 6
25 Para 7 and see para 8 where it is argued, with reference to Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 6 SA 
21 (SCA), that a contract concluded by parties in a position of unequal bargaining power may in certain 
circumstances be struck down on the basis of “public policy and constitutional grounds”  See also the 
reference to cases dealing with public policy in n 5 above
26 Napier v Barkhuizen 2006 4 SA 1 (SCA) para 10ff
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to the time limitation provision.27 The judge felt that the case required, as 
a threshold issue, that the proper methodology for constitutional challenges 
to contractual terms had to be determined.28 He then asked whether it was 
appropriate to test a contractual clause against a provision of the Bill of Rights 
and commenced by observing that
“[t]his raises the question of horizontality, that is, the direct application of the Bill of Rights to private 
persons as contemplated in section 8(2) and (3) of the Constitution. This Court has yet to consider 
this issue”.29
Ngcobo J rejected the court a quo’s attempt to overcome the two techni-
cal difficulties created by the wording of section 36 and section 172(1)(a).30 
Hanging the clause on the peg of the pacta sunt servanda principle did not 
surmount these difficulties,31 as it was the contractual clause that was found 
to be flawed. Moreover, section 172(1)(a) could not have been applied to the 
contractual provision on the basis that it constituted “conduct” as it “mani-
festly” did not fall into this category.32 He postulated that these difficulties
“… cast grave doubt on the appropriateness of testing the constitutionality of a contractual term 
directly against a provision in the Bill of Rights”.33
He further concluded that constitutional challenges to contractual terms 
should ordinarily have to be viewed through the prism of public policy,34 and 
that
“… the proper approach to the constitutional challenges to contractual terms is to determine whether 
the term challenged is contrary to public policy as evidenced by the constitutional values, in particular 
those found in the Bill of Rights.”35
Further justifications were given for this approach. First, all law derives 
from the Constitution and is therefore subject to constitutional control.36 
Any common law rule of the law of contract would be invalid in so far 
as it is inconsistent with the Constitution. Courts are furthermore obliged 
in terms of section 39(2) to develop the common law in accordance with 
the Constitution.37 Secondly, public policy is rooted in the Constitution, 
and therefore the Constitution should impact on contracts through public 
policy.38 Thirdly, the proposed approach would allow proper space for bal-
27 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 20
28 Para 22
29 Para 23
30 Paras 23-26, 30
31 See text before n 17 above
32 Paras 24-27
33 Para 26
34 Paras 28-30, 36
35 Para 30
36 See also Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA) para 27; Pharmaceutical Manufacturers 
Association of SA: In re Ex parte President of the Republic of South Africa 2000 2 SA 674 (CC) para 44; S v 
Thebus 2003 6 SA 505 (CC) para 25; Woolman “Application” in Woolman, Roux & Bishop Constitutional 
Law of South Africa 2 ed (2006) 31-8, 31-49
37 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 35
38 Paras 27-30
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ancing the principle of freedom of contract against the values enshrined in 
the Constitution.39
The judges who handed down dissenting minority judgments, Sachs J and 
Moseneke DCJ, unquestioningly measured the time limitation against public 
policy as infused by the Constitution.40 Nevertheless, Langa CJ in a separate 
concurring judgment expressed his disagreement in so far as Ngcobo J held 
that the Constitution could only apply to contracts indirectly and in terms of 
section 39(2). Indirect application would generally be best for dealing with the 
types of problems before the court, but Langa CJ was “not convinced that sec-
tion 8 does not allow for the possibility that certain rights may apply directly 
to contractual terms or the common law that underlies them”.41
Direct application of the Constitution would be justified in some cases. Still, 
he left open the question whether the Constitution could have been directly 
applied in this case, and accepted that the choice between direct and indirect 
application would seldom be outcome determinative.42
2 1  evaluation: the broad themes
Ngcobo J’s statement that the Constitutional court had not previously con-
sidered the horizontal application of the Constitution appears to be incorrect.43 
Nevertheless, the exact impact of the Constitution on private or horizontal 
relationships continues to be a highly problematic and controversial area of 
law.44 The confusion can in no small part be attributed to the imprecise word-
ing of the Constitutional provisions that deal with this aspect.45 However, as 
is shown by the judgments in this matter, the courts have certainly played 
their part in worsening the muddle.
Two aspects should form the backbone of any evaluation of the application 
of the Constitution to private law and private relations.
First, the Constitution is to be given a wide field of application. After the 
Constitutional Court interpreted the application provisions in the Interim 
Constitution restrictively,46 the drafters of the final Constitution were at pains 
to extend its field of application.47 The preamble of the Constitution already 
39 Para 30  See also the approach in para 48 to the limitation of constitutional rights in the context of public 
policy and its relation to s 36  
40 Especially para 93ff, paras 122-124, 158-161, 162-163, 170, 174, 176-177, 181, 183, 185
41 Para 186
42 Para 186
43 Para 23  See Khumalo v Holomisa 2002 5 SA 401 (CC) para 29ff; Woolman “The amazing vanishing Bill 
of Rights” 2007 SALJ 762 773  However, it is possible that Ngcobo J only meant the statement to apply in 
the context of contract law
44 It may be that the term “horizontality” in Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 23 was used to 
mean direct horizontality  This is perhaps how the term “horizontal” was understood in the court a quo  
See generally Woolman “Application” in Constitutional Law of SA 31-5 n 1
45 Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 5 ed (2004) 50 call the provisions opaque and apparently 
circular
46 Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 3 SA 850 (CC)
47 Cheadle “Application” in Cheadle, Davis & Haysom (eds) South African Constitutional Law: The Bill 
of Rights 2 ed service 6 (2005) 3-8 to 3-9; Currie & De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 34; Van der Walt 
“Perspectives on Horizontal Application: Du Plessis v De Klerk revisited” 1997 SA Publiekreg 1 8-9 with 
reference to the judgement of Kriegler J in Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 3 SA 850 (CC) 717; Woolman 
“Application” in Constitutional Law of SA 31-6, 31-76 n 1
BARKHUIZEN v NAPIER 395
confirms that society has to be fundamentally reformed. The Constitution 
makes a clear break with the preceding legal order. It is impossible to think 
that this break should not also have profound consequences for horizontal 
relationships. Many of the abuses of the apartheid system and much of the 
exploitation that marked apartheid society occurred on a horizontal level.48 
Private law assisted in creating the values of apartheid South Africa against 
which the Constitution turns its face: equality must replace inequality, dig-
nity repression and transparency suppression of information. A restrictive 
approach would rely on the public-private divide to an extent that simply does 
not accord with the basic tenets of our Constitution and society.49
Secondly, there is a need for a logical and sensible scheme for dealing with 
the Constitution in relationships between private parties. Although different 
and conflicting interpretations may achieve acceptable results in some cases 
and be justifiable on the strict wording of the Constitution, inconsistent judg-
ments on the meaning of direct and indirect application are untenable. The 
resulting confusion makes it difficult to follow and develop the reasoning of 
the courts. Moreover, it will be argued that different consequences will ensue 
depending on the manner in which the Constitution applies to private law.50 
Consistency therefore must be an important goal also for this area of law.51
Especially the first point of departure should be clearly articulated. Less 
time should be devoted to arcane technical arguments regarding the mechan-
ics for applying the Constitution in private relations.
Ngcobo J’s rebuke in Napier of counsel’s conflation of arguments confirms 
that parties in a horizontal relationship should clearly choose their path to 
the Constitution.52 However, it is not clear what direct and indirect applica-
tion entails and how direct application relates to indirect application of the 
Constitution.53 Commentators and courts struggle to find common ground 
because there appears to be no universal meanings of the expressions “direct” 
and “indirect” application.54
48 These arguments are not trumped by the counter-arguments of Sprigman & Osborne “Du Plessis is not 
dead: South Africa’s 1996 Constitution and the Application of the Bill of Rights to Private Disputes” 1999 
SAJHR 25 40ff  They are not sensitive enough to the unique needs of South Africa  Nevertheless, some 
of their arguments should caution the courts in giving sway to the Constitution in particular cases (see 
n 71 below)  The response of Woolman “Application” in Constitutional Law of SA 31-139 to 39-141 is not 
adequate
49 Woolman “Application” in Constitutional Law of SA 31-5  In this regard, the principle of avoidance articu-
lated by Currie & De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 50, 75-78 and De Waal, Currie & Erasmus The Bill of 
Rights Handbook 4th ed (2001) 37, 194-195 must be approached with care  See the criticism of Woolman 
“Application” in Constitutional Law of SA 31-141ff  Cf also the response of Sprigman and Osborne 1999 
SAJHR 46  For a good summary of the arguments relating to the way in which the division between public 
and private law plays out in the law of contract, see Pretorius “Individualism, Collectivism and the limits 
of Good Faith” 2003 THRHR 638
50 See text after n 117 below
51 Woolman “Application” in Constitutional Law of SA 31-10, 31-13, 31-55 to 31-56; Woolman 2007 SALJ 
763
52 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 20
53 See also the descriptions in Currie & De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 35
54 See the summary of arguments in Woolman “Application” in Constitutional Law of SA 31-136
396 STELL LR 2008 3
2 2  direct application of the constitution in terms of section 8
When answering his first question regarding the extent to which the provi-
sions of the Bill of Rights will apply between contracting parties, Cameron JA 
stated that the “law of contract” is subject to the Constitution and that “[t]his 
means that courts are obliged to take fundamental constitutional values into 
account”.55 This probably is a reference to indirect application.56 Accordingly, 
it may be suggested that he eschewed direct application in favour of indirect 
application. However, such a conclusion is not justifiable. He opened this part 
of the judgment with the “general endorsement” of the direct approach fol-
lowed in the court a quo.57 It is evident from Brisley v Drotsky,58 on which he 
relied in Napier,59 that he accepted the possibility of both direct and indirect 
application.60 The judge’s emphasis on indirect application in answering his 
first question, perhaps makes sense only if it is read subject to the conclusion 
reached on the second question, namely that section 34 of the Constitution 
was not directly applicable on the facts.61 However, the judgment does not 
promote a better understanding of direct application.
Ngcobo J in Napier confirmed that sections 8(2) and 8(3) are the central 
provisions which determine direct application of the Constitution to private 
parties.62 On the face of it, the approach of Ngcobo J seems to resemble that 
of O’Regan J in the earlier case of Khumalo v Holomisa.63 De Villiers J in the 
court a quo, by implication, relied on section 8(1) as the catalyst for directly 
applying the Constitution because that provision determines that the “Bill of 
Rights applies to all law” and binds the judiciary, but he accepted that sec-
tion 8(1) was subject to sections 8(2) and 8(3).64 This understanding accords 
with what Stuart Woolman calls a “good faith” interpretation of the Khumalo 
case.65
It is preferable to anchor horizontal application of the Constitution in 
section 8(1) and Ngcobo J’s judgment is perhaps open to a more benevolent 
interpretation. It could be that he merely omitted a reference to section 8(1) 
because sections 8(2) and 8(3) determine how the Constitution will apply to 
55 Napier v Barkhuizen 2006 4 SA 1 (SCA) paras 6-8
56 See 2 3 below
57 Para 6
58 Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA) para 88
59 Napier v Barkhuizen 2006 4 SA 1 (SCA) para 6
60 See Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 38 where the Constitutional Court found that the public 
policy argument was “run together with the argument on direct application”
61 Para 17ff and see 3 below
62 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 23  See also Currie & De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 43  
Van der Walt “Progressive Indirect Horizontal Application of the Bill of Rights: towards a co-operative 
relation between Common-Law and Constitutional Jurisprudence” 2001 SAJHR 341, 351 regards s 8(2) as 
the basis for direct application but he takes a particularly narrow view of direct application  See further 
Van der Walt 1997 SA Publiekreg 4-5, 16 n 28, 20 on the possible interpretations of s 8(2) within his 
scheme
63 Khumalo v Holomisa 2002 5 SA 401 (CC) paras 31-32
64 Barkhuizen v Napier TPD 17-09-2004 case no 33129/01 8ff  Cameron JA also wrote in the idiom of s 8(1) 
when describing the basis for applying the Constitution in Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA)  He relied 
on this case in Napier v Barkhuizen 2006 4 SA 1 (SCA) para 6, although it is unclear how he viewed the 
relationship between s 8(1) and other parts of s 8
65 See Woolman “Application” in Constitutional Law of SA 31-7, 31-47, 31-63; Woolman 2007 SALJ 773
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horizontal relationships and are specifically dedicated to horizontal relation-
ships. Nevertheless, Woolman argues that the provision which unlocks direct 
application is the widely worded section 8(1) and that sections 8(2) and 8(3) 
play a very restrictive role in resolving application problems. He relies on 
three basic criticisms for rejecting his good faith interpretation of the Khumalo 
case.66 The first two criticisms are that it would cause the application of the 
Constitution to private parties to be deferred and potentially suppressed,67 
and that this interpretation does not respect the wording of section 8(1).68 
The third criticism is that such an interpretation would be a retrograde step. 
The Interim Constitution applied, without more, to statutes even where they 
applied horizontally. But if this interpretation is accepted, the application of 
the Constitution in these situations would be subject to section 8(2). This would 
cause inconsistent treatment of legislative provisions that apply to horizontal 
as well as vertical relationships.69
The first two criticisms can be addressed with relative ease. When it is said 
that section 8(2) is central to the operation of the Constitution, it does not 
mean that section 8(1) is not applicable to horizontal relationships. Section 
8(1) is a general provision that must be read subject to the more specific sec-
tion 8(2).70 Furthermore, some deferment of the application of the Bill of 
Rights may be necessary to ensure that the rights applied are appropriate to 
private relationships,71 albeit that the threshold should be relatively low.72 
Application questions are open and shut. In most cases the focus should not be 
on whether a provision in the Bill of Rights applies directly, but rather on the 
extent to which it applies.
The last criticism calls for a more sophisticated response.73 As long as the 
purpose of section 8(2) is to determine whether it will be appropriate to apply 
a Constitutional provision to a horizontal relationship, it makes sense to have 
it apply to all horizontal relationships, whether they are subject to statutory or 
common law.74 The application of section 8(2) to statutory provisions will not 
be a retrograde step as long as it is applied with some sensitivity. Where legis-
66 Woolman “Application” in Constitutional Law of SA 31-6ff, 31-42ff, 31-63 to 31-64; Woolman 2007 SALJ 
773
67 Woolman “Application” in Constitutional Law of SA 31-48 to 31-49
68 31-52 to 31-53, 31-56ff
69 31-49 to 31-52
70 31-7, 31-47ff, 31-62ff  Woolman distinguishes “range of application” and “prescriptive content”  See also 
the somewhat analogous distinction drawn in De Waal et al The Bill of Rights Handbook 37, 46 and 
the reference to “reach” and “application”, but cf Woolman “Application” in Constitutional Law of SA 
31-141ff  The argument is made slightly differently in Currie & De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 43-44; 
see also the argument on the meaning of s 8(1) at 48
71 Currie & De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 52-55  See Sprigman and Osborne 1999 SAJHR 41ff who argue 
that this calls for indirect application of the Constitution  I do not agree but believe it should play some 
role in determining whether the Constitution can be directly applied
72 See Currie & De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 52-54  The application of s 8(2) in Barkhuizen v Napier 
TPD 17-09-2004 case no 33129/01 9-10 appears to be quite superficial, but perhaps little more is called 
for
73 See also Van der Walt 2001 SAJHR 347 who argues that these are not horizontal application cases and the 
different earlier argument by Van der Walt 1997 SA Publiekreg 19 n 36
74 If the same situation had occurred in 2001, the question before court would have been whether the rule in 
the Policyholder Protection Rules (Short-term Insurance) 2001 para 10 4 (replaced by para 7 4(a) in 2004) 
accorded with the Constitution  These rules have been enacted as subordinate legislation in terms of s 55 
of the Short-term Insurance Act 53 of 1998
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lation applies in vertical and horizontal relationships, it is unlikely that section 
8(2) will have a substantial effect on the manner in which the Constitution 
is applied. Furthermore, the distinction between sections 8(1) and 8(2) will 
not lead to inconsistency as long as private parties to a dispute are allowed 
to attack a provision on the basis that it also applies in vertical relationships 
where it will be inconsistent with the Constitution. No difficulty will arise, 
if a provision applies both to vertical and horizontal relationships, as long 
as parties in a horizontal relationship are allowed to attack the provision on 
the basis that it would be unconstitutional if it is applied vertically, and if the 
provision would then also cease to apply horizontally.
Finally, and in response to all his objections, it seems that Woolman finds it 
exceedingly difficult to make sense of sections 8(2) and 8(3) on his expansive 
interpretation of section 8(1).75
So what function should section 8(3) then play in applying the Constitution 
in horizontal relationships? It will be apparent from the initial analysis that 
De Villiers J in the court a quo wavered between direct application of the 
Constitution to the contract itself and direct application to the law of contract. 
He acknowledged that section 8(3) requires development of the common law 
but the contractual provision was, for the most part, measured directly against 
the provisions of the Constitution.76 The judge’s attempt to circumvent 
the difficulties of applying sections 36 and 172 directly to the contract was 
rightly regarded as confusing by Ngcobo J. However, the reasoning of the 
Constitutional court is itself incomplete.
First, it does not show that section 36 could not have been applied in this 
context. A better response would have been to evaluate the contractual clause 
by balancing section 34 directly against the principle of pacta sunt servanda 
and its more specific application in the context of time limitations: to regard 
the contractual clause as the object that had to be evaluated after balancing 
section 34 and these countervailing laws of general application. This would 
not have made the application of the Constitution “indirect”.
Furthermore the court merely could have treated the contractual provision, 
or at least its conclusion, as “conduct”, which may be declared invalid in terms 
of section 172.77 The court a quo probably slid into difficulty because it did 
not clearly articulate the form which direct application was to take in the 
circumstances.
Nevertheless, there may be another unassailable objection to the direct 
application of the Constitution to a contractual provision as contemplated in 
75 Woolman “Application” in Constitutional Law of SA 31-56ff is very complicated and not entirely convinc-
ing  See especially 31-74 to 31-75 where the author apparently ignores the specific reference in s 8(3) to 
s 8(2)  It may also be proposed that s 8(2) and 8(3) is intended to be used to fill gaps where they exist in 
the extant common law but the criticism of this approach by Woolman persuasively disposes of such an 
argument 31-11, 31-65 to 31-66, 31-71 to 31-74  The most important reason for the exposition in Khumalo 
v Holomisa 2002 5 SA 401 (CC) para 31 was an attempt to make sense of all aspects of s 8
76 Text after n 11 above
77 It is not at all clear why the clause was described as “manifestly not ‘conduct’” (Barkhuizen v Napier 
2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 25 per Ngcobo J)  See the somewhat different criticism of Woolman 2007 SALJ 
774-775  It is based on an interpretation of the case which does not appear to be defensible
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the court a quo. In Khumalo78 the court accepted that section 8(3) means 
that the common law has to be evaluated and developed to accord with the 
Constitution, once the hurdle of section 8(2) has been crossed and it is found 
that the common law conflicts with the Constitution.79 This would leave con-
siderable scope for the direct application of the Constitution to the common 
law. Conversely, it would almost close off application of the Constitution as 
directly applicable law to conduct, whether in the form of contracts or oth-
erwise, in disputes between private parties. It could be argued that Ngcobo 
J only used the expression “direct application” to refer to application of the 
Constitution to contractual provisions.80 This reflects too narrow an under-
standing of direct application. But the grave doubt which Ngcobo J expressed 
about the propriety of testing “the constitutionality of a contractual term 
directly [in this narrow sense] against a provision of the Bill of Rights”81 con-
ceivably should be understood to refer only to this very narrow understanding 
of direct application.82
There is one more or less plausible alternative interpretation of section 8(3). 
The provision may be read to mean that it merely provides for the development 
of remedies to enforce directly applied Constitutional precepts.83 Such an 
interpretation leaves a wider domain for section 8(1) and accords better with 
the ordinary meaning of the term “direct application”. But this construction 
relies too heavily on the phrase “in order to give effect to the right” and does 
not adequately explain the relationship between sections 8(2) and 8(3). This 
of course does not mean that section 8(3) does not at least also allow for the 
development of adequate remedies, but perhaps it should not be interpreted to 
have only this function.
It therefore is sensible to give section 8(3) a wide interpretation and to allow 
Constitutional influence to occur through development of the current com-
mon law as it ensures systemic accommodation of the Constitution in the 
common law.84 There is a danger that this opens the door for those who want 
to restrain the Constitution in the corset of existing common law, but this 
78 Khumalo v Holomisa 2002 5 SA 401 (CC)
79 This apparently is also the view of O’Regan J in Khumalo v Holomisa 2002 5 SA 401 (CC) paras 32-33  
See also Cockrell “Private law and the Bill of Rights: a threshold issue of ‘Horizontality’ in Bill of Rights 
Compendium service 22 (1998) paras 3A8 and 3A7; Lubbe “Taking Fundamental Rights seriously: the 
Bill of Rights and its implications for the development of Contract Law” 2004 SALJ 395 especially 395-
396, 407  See also the sophisticated argument of Lubbe 2004 SALJ 403-404 regarding the distinction 
between the application of the Constitution to conduct and law and its development by means of open 
legal norms  The description of the operation of the Constitution put forward here would be correct as 
long as these norms can be described as law (see n 160 below)
80 When referring to direct application, this is the only form of application apparently contemplated by 
Ngcobo J in Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) paras 16, 20, 26, 38  But this should be contrasted 
with the approach of Langa CJ, who accepted that direct application could concern the application of a 
right to “contractual terms or the common law that underlies them” (para 186)  
81 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 26
82 See n 44 above on the problems with terminology in this case and text next to nn 99-101 below
83 Jooste v Botha 2000 2 SA 199 (T) 203ff  See also Currie & De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 226-227; 
De Waal et al The Bill of Rights Handbook 194-196; and the somewhat wider approach of Woolman 
“Application” in Constitutional Law of SA 31-66ff
84 Section 8(3) would make it impossible for parties to rely directly on the Constitution when there are rules 
of contract law which deal with the issue  An analysis of this issue is provided in Van der Merwe, Van 
Huysteen, Reinecke & Lubbe Contract General Principles 3 ed (2007) 16-18
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danger will have to be addressed elsewhere if proper effect is to be given to 
the Constitution in private law relationships.85
2 3  application of the constitution in terms of section 39(2)
So when will the Constitution be applied indirectly?86 Section 39(2) is gen-
erally interpreted to form the basis for indirect application of the Constitution. 
This section inter alia states that
“… when developing the common law … every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, 
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights”.87
In S v Thebus,88 Moseneke J accurately observed that
“[t]his section does not specify what triggers the need to develop the common law or in which circum-
stances the development of the common law is justified.”89
He continued that
“the need to develop the common law under s 39(2) could arise in at least two instances. The first 
would be when a rule of the common law is inconsistent with a constitutional provision. Repugnancy 
of this kind would compel an adaptation of the common law to resolve the inconsistency. The second 
possibility arises even when a rule of the common law is not inconsistent with a specific constitu-
tional provision but may fall short of its spirit, purport and objects. Then, the common law must be 
adapted and developed to create harmony with the ‘objective normative value system’ found in the 
Constitution”.90
Many courts have utilized section 39(2) without much contemplation about 
its place within the constellation of application provisions.91 But if section 8 
is given the wide sway proposed in Khumalo,92 it would make sense to read 
section 39(2) restrictively. In terms of section 39(2) reference therefore should 
not be made to the specific rights listed in the Constitution, but reliance should 
be placed on the general values underlying the Constitution.93
Iain Currie and Johan De Waal have listed several mechanisms for indi-
rect application of the Constitution. Obviously, the common law may be 
applied with due regard to the Bill of Rights.94 Next, open-ended common 
law norms such as good faith, public policy and the legal convictions of the 
community may be developed in the light of the Bill of Rights.95 Finally, it is 
85 Van der Walt 2001 SAJHR 355, 359ff  Lubbe 2004 SALJ 399 401 argues that this approach mirrors the 
narrow approach to public policy and good faith that has emanated from the Supreme Court of Appeal in 
recent times  See text next to nn 179-180 below
86 Van der Walt 2001 SAJHR 345 takes a narrow view of indirect application  See the difficulties foreseen 
by Lubbe 2004 SALJ 399 423
87 Of course it is difficult to determine exactly what this means  Woolman “Application” in Constitutional 
Law of SA 31-93 to 31-95
88 2003 6 SA 505 (CC)
89 Para 25
90 S v Thebus 2003 6 SA 505 (CC) para 28  Currie & De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 67; Lubbe 2004 SALJ 
402-403
91 See text next to n 123
92 Khumalo v Holomisa 2002 5 SA 401 (CC)
93 Woolman “Application” in Constitutional Law of SA 31-12, 31-78ff  I therefore agree fully with the criti-
cism of Masiya v Director of Public Prosecutions 2007 5 SA 30 (CC) in Woolman 2007 SALJ 767ff
94 Although s 39(2) refers merely to interpretation of legislation, the term “developing” probably should be 
interpreted widely
95 Van der Walt 2001 SAJHR 351-352
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also uncontroversial that specific common law norms may be developed with 
reference to the Bill of Rights.96 The only difficulty would be to determine to 
what extent development will be possible in terms of section 39(2).97 In the 
ordinary course, the development of the common law is in the hands of the 
courts. Development is normally subject to many constraints ranging from the 
stare decisis principle to the notion that law should be made by the democrati-
cally elected legislator rather than the judiciary. However, it is suggested that 
these constraints are of reduced significance in the Constitutional context.98
In Napier Cameron JA did not refer specifically to section 39(2) or sec-
tion 8 but in answering the first question regarding the extent to which the 
Constitution applied between the contracting parties, he used the language of 
indirect application.99 Ngcobo J apparently did not think that the Constitution 
could be applied to contracts in terms of sections 8(2) and 8(3) (the direct 
application provisions).100 For the most part he wrote in the idiom of indirect 
application as it is understood in section 39(2). yet he curiously did not con-
clusively pin his colours to one Constitutional mast. Indeed, he mentioned that 
the common law had to be developed with reference to both section 39(2) and 
section 8(3)(b).101
Cameron JA resolved his first question with reference to fundamental 
or founding Constitutional values, which he gleaned from section 1 of the 
Constitution.102 Conversely, Ngcobo J referred to “values that underlie our 
constitutional democracy as given expression by the provisions of the Bill 
of Rights”103 and “constitutional values, in particular those found in the Bill 
of Rights”.104 The approach of the Constitutional Court is confused and it 
disrespects the Constitutional text.105 It demotes specific constitutional rights 
to the level of values – what Stuart Woolman colourfully calls “speaking in 
values”.106 Woolman states that the court “decided not to analyze the prob-
lem in terms of any of the specific substantive provisions”.107 This does not 
appear to be correct. Considerable reference was made to section 34 and its 
effect. Woolman admits as much later in his article.108 However, by filtering it 
96 Currie & De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 68-69
97 S 39(2) does not require development but only determines that development must be done in terms of the 
Constitution
98 See text next to nn 117-122 and 135-139 below
99 Napier v Barkhuizen 2006 4 SA 1 (SCA) para 6ff  See also Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) 
para 16 where Ngcobo J considered that the second part of Cameron JA’s judgment concerned direct 
application
100 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 23ff  See the argument of counsel in Afrox Healthcare Bpk 
v Strydom 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA) para 16, discussed in Lubbe 2004 SALJ 399
101 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 35  See also the argument made in the text next to nn 80-82 
above, and the narrow focus on indirect application discussed in the text next to n 129 below  See further 
nn 130, 131 below
102 Napier v Barkhuizen 2006 4 SA 1 (SCA) paras 6-7, 11, 13, 14  See also Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 
(SCA) para 91
103 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 29
104 Para 30  Moseneke DCJ emphasized “constitutional values” (para 104) but he apparently interpreted the 
expression widely, as he made specific reference to s 34 in the context of public policy  See para 108 where 
he referred with approval to the judgment of Sachs J
105 Woolman 2007 SALJ 778 describes this sentence as “odd indeed”
106 763
107 772
108 777ff
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through values the court diluted section 34, and then equated it with sanctity 
of contract, which is not specifically guaranteed in the Constitution.109 The 
approach followed confuses direct application, which concerns specific con-
stitutional rights, with indirect application, which should occur by reference 
to the values underlying the Constitution.110
Cameron JA in answering his first question emphasized that the Constitution 
would impact upon contract law through public policy.111 Ngcobo J regarded 
the requirement that a contract should not conflict with public policy as the 
contract law construct that had to be utilized to absorb constitutional prin-
ciples in the law of contract.112 However, the justifications for using public 
policy as the necessary hook to hang constitutional principles onto the law of 
contract are unconvincing.
Both judges relied on the idea that public policy can now be sourced from 
the Constitution. The correctness of this statement will be challenged,113 but 
even if it is accurate, then it still does not follow that the Constitution should 
necessarily be applied through the medium of public policy.
Furthermore, the contention of Ngcobo J that all law is now derived from 
the Constitution and that constitutional values should be mediated through 
public policy is a non sequitur. The first statement is a justification for judging 
contract law against the Constitution, but it cannot be used to justify the use 
of public policy for this purpose.
Finally, Ngcobo J’s suggestion that account should be taken of constitu-
tional principles through public policy, because it would allow proper space 
for balancing constitutional rights with the principle of pacta sunt servanda, 
is similarly unpersuasive. It is wrong for three reasons. First, it is based on the 
incorrect assumption that section 36 cannot be used to limit a constitutional 
right when the constitutionality of a contract is considered directly. Secondly, 
the argument that space should be left for balancing constitutional principles 
against pacta servanda sunt, even if it favours indirect application, cannot 
be used to show that such indirect application should take place specifically 
through the medium of public policy. Thirdly, the contention accords too 
much weight to sanctity of contract. Ngcobo J’s wide approach regarding the 
meaning of constitutional principles, could be seen as a licence for courts to 
equate specifically guaranteed constitutional rights with sanctity of contract 
which does not have the same status.114
Yet, a better justification for applying the Constitution through public 
policy in a case such as this can be found in the law of contract. Contracts that 
conflict with public policy, like contracts that conflict with ordinary legisla-
tion, are illegal because they conflict with broader societal interests. Most 
109 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 57  This comment has already been made about the cases 
before Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC)  Van der Merwe et al Contract 322-323
110 See text next to nn 139-141, 158 below
111 Napier v Barkhuizen 2006 4 SA 1 (SCA) para 8  See the analysis of earlier cases in Lubbe 2004 SALJ 
399-400
112 See text next to n 34 above
113 See 2 5 below
114 See also text next to n 109 above
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constitutional values will be relevant to contracts for the same reason. Even in 
the pre-constitutional era, contracts that deprived contracting parties of access 
to the courts were illegal for being against public policy.115 Nevertheless, this 
justification will not apply universally. The manner in which the Constitution 
should apply ought to depend on the nature of the constitutional right and 
the nature of the attack on existing contract law. Public policy often will be 
the most appropriate area for accommodating the Constitution, but it will not 
always be the case.116
2 4  the priority of sections 8 and 39 and the interface between these 
provisions
The difference between direct and indirect application should not be 
exaggerated.117 It will indeed be difficult to show that a particular choice of 
approach will be “outcome determinative”.118 Nonetheless, the distinction will 
have some consequences. The rules regarding locus standi,119 remedies120 
and the application of the stare decisis principle121 may give the Constitution 
wider sway in cases of direct application. Moreover, there are symbolic and 
methodological differences between direct and indirect application of the 
Constitution, which perhaps may strengthen the influence of the Constitution 
when it is directly applied.122 So how have the various courts in the Napier 
matter tackled this relationship between direct and indirect application of the 
Constitution?
There appears to be a general bias in favour of indirect application in the 
case law. Judges have often opted for indirect application without much delib-
eration.123 In Napier, even Langa CJ, who was prepared to allow a wider scope 
for direct application of the Constitution, accepted that contractual terms will 
“ordinarily” be subject to indirect application of the Constitution.124
Outside the judgment of Langa CJ, the Napier case is not helpful in deter-
mining priorities. De Villiers J in the court a quo did not clearly consider 
115 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 34  See also Napier v Barkhuizen 2006 4 SA 1 (SCA) para 
10 with reference to Christie The Law of Contract in South Africa 4 ed (2001) 405-407
116 Christie “The Law of Contract and the Bill of Rights” in Bill of Rights Compendium issue 22 (1998) 
para 3H6  See also Lubbe 2004 SALJ 405 and Van der Merwe et al Contract 192 on the manner in which 
incongruence of contracts with the Constitution should be dealt with
117 Currie & De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 50-51, 74-75; Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 5 BCLR 658 (CC) 
697 per Mahomed DP; Van der Walt 1997 SA Publiekreg 3; Van der Walt 2001 SAJHR 343, 348, 355  See 
2 1 and text next to nn 97-98 above and text next to nn 135-139 below
118 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 186 per Langa CJ
119 De Waal et al The Bill of Rights Handbook 64, 83  See also Currie & De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 
81-82 who show that this distinction may not be of great importance
120 Currie & De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 74-75, but see text next to n 83 above  Their argument is based 
on a somewhat different approach to direct and indirect application
121 Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA) paras 27-29; Currie & De Waal Bill of Rights 
Handbook 69-72; Lubbe 2004 SALJ 409-410, 415, 419; S v Walters 2001 2 SACR 471 (Tk); Woolman 
“Application” in Constitutional Law of SA 31-95ff
122 This perhaps is one of the main reasons why the Constitution has not been applied in private relations in 
a more “muscular” manner  Woolman 2007 SALJ 766 n 6
123 Currie & De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 50-51
124 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 186  It is therefore doubtful whether Woolman 2007 SALJ 
762 is correct when he states that the Chief Justice “possessed the requisite insight to steer clear of this 
miasma of legal reasoning”
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the relationship between direct and indirect application. He merely applied 
section 34 directly. Cameron JA did not explain his priorities very clearly, 
and the order in which he addressed direct and indirect application of the 
Constitution leaves much to be desired.125 Ultimately, all that can be said 
about his judgment is that he probably recognized both direct and indirect 
application.126 Ngcobo J focused on indirect application127 and left little room 
for direct application.128 He only foresaw that different considerations would 
apply where the state is a party to the contract, but he did not elaborate on 
whether this would also apply where the state does not exercise state power 
and is an ordinary contracting party in this sense.129
Nevertheless, the preceding analysis suggests that the bias in favour of 
indirect application should be reconsidered. If a specific Constitutional right 
is implicated, a section 8 analysis should be peremptory. Such an analysis 
will also require consideration of the values underlying specific constitutional 
rights. A combination of section 39(2) and section 8 may be called for. In this 
respect the reference of De Villiers J to section 39(2) in the context of his 
attempt to apply section 8(3) may be justifiable.130 But, the exact function of 
section 39(2) and the priorities created by the enumeration of specific rights 
in the Constitution must remain uppermost in such situations. Section 39(2) 
should be applied exclusively only if there are no specific constitutional rights 
that are relevant to a dispute,131 to prevent the type of confusion of principle 
and right that marked the majority judgment of the Constitutional Court.132
It follows that Napier should have been decided as a direct application case 
in terms of section 8 of the Constitution. This does not mean that public policy 
could not still have been used as the appropriate vehicle for giving effect to 
the Constitution in this case,133 but it should have been considered in terms of 
sections 8(2) and 8(3). Although it has been stated that public policy typically 
gives effect to indirect application of the Constitution, there is no reason why 
125 See text next to nn 19-21 above on the two questions asked
126 See text next to nn 55-61, 99 above
127 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 35, although Ngcobo J did not make a very clear connection 
between his approach and s 39(2)  See Woolman 2007 SALJ 763
128 See 2 2 and the text next to nn 99-101 above
129 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) paras 27-28, but see text next to n 101 above
130 Barkhuizen v Napier TPD 17-09-2004 case no 33129/01 10  This happens quite often: see Woolman 
“Application” in Constitutional Law of SA 31-10, 31-55, 31-77ff and the somewhat strange statement in 
31-45 n 1  See also Lubbe 2004 SALJ 395  The reference by Ngcobo J to ss 39(2) and 8 in Barkhuizen v 
Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 35 cannot be explained on this basis, as the judge clearly referred to s 8 
in the context of indirect application; see text next to n 101 above
131 Woolman 2007 SALJ 776ff is endorsed  In this respect the reference to s 39(2) and 8(3)(b) in Barkhuizen 
v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) para 35 seems perplexing; see text next to n 101 above
132 See text next to nn 109-110 above
133 See Van der Walt 2001 SAJHR 362 on the important role which public policy can play, although he would 
regard this type of situation as one of indirect application  In some cases the courts have stated that public 
policy is rooted or anchored in constitutional values, which suggests that it should be relevant in terms 
of the indirect application of the Constitution: Bafana Finance Mabopane v Makwakwa 2006 4 SA 581 
(SCA) para 11  A similar impression may be created by Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 
(Centre for Applied Legal Studies Intervening) 2001 4 SA 938 (CC) para 54 and the reference to German 
law in n 57  But in Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA) para 18, Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 
SA 1 (SCA) para 91 and Price Waterhouse Coopers Inc v National Potato Co-operative Ltd 2004 6 SA 66 
(SCA) para 24 it was accepted that public policy was rooted in the Constitution and constitutional values  
See also text next to n 147 below
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it cannot be the vehicle for developing the law in the case of direct application 
of the Constitution.134
The Constitutional Court’s preference for indirect application without prop-
erly considering direct application in terms of section 8 probably did not cause 
too much harm in this case because of the majority’s wide interpretation of 
the sources from which constitutional values could be derived.135 Moreover, 
this would have been the case even if the decision had been handed down by a 
lower court.136 In Afrox it was made apparent that lower courts have the same 
wide scope to give effect to the Constitution in order to develop open-ended 
norms indirectly as they have when applying the Constitution directly.137 
Nevertheless, the symbolism of direct application would still have suggested a 
more forceful approach than indirect application.138 It also would have allowed 
for a more careful balancing of sanctity of contract and the constitutional right 
to have access to the courts.139 Woolman argues that the judgment of Ngcobo 
J “relies upon a rather baffling conflation of rights analysis, value analysis and 
public-policy analysis”.140 This of course is true; but the statement should not 
be read to mean that direct application cannot be done within the context of 
public policy. It is really the filtering of constitutional rights and public policy 
through the concept of values which confounds an understanding of Ngcobo 
J’s judgment.141
2 5  does all public policy derive from the constitution?
Cameron JA stated that “’public policy’ now derives from the founding 
constitutional values”.142 Moseneke DCJ in his minority judgment found 
that public notions of equity and fairness are now “sourced” from the 
Constitution.143 Ngcobo J held that the determination of the concept public 
policy was once fraught with difficulties, but that is no longer true, and that 
public policy now has to be determined by reference to the values that underlie 
our constitutional democracy as it receives expression in the Bill of Rights. 
He further stated that public policy is now “evidenced” by these constitutional 
values.144
These judges suggest that in all cases public policy should be derived from 
the Constitution. Ngcobo J justified his conclusion on the basis that public 
policy represents the legal convictions of the community;145 the Constitution 
itself makes it clear that our society is founded on the values set out in the 
134 See text next to n 160 below on the nature of public policy
135 See text next to n 104 above
136 As proposed by Woolman 2007 SALJ 779-781
137 Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA)
138 See text next to nn 98, 118-122 above
139 Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA) paras 25-35
140 Woolman 2007 SALJ 772, 779
141 See the criticism in the text next to nn 109-110 above
142 Napier v Barkhuizen 2006 4 SA 1 (SCA) para 7
143 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 104
144 Paras 28-30
145 Para 28  See para 73 where reference was made to the legal synonym “boni mores”  See also para 117 per 
Moseneke DCJ and paras 140, 141, 146, 175, 176, 177 per Sachs J  
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Constitution and that the Bill of Rights is the cornerstone of our democracy.146 
But these arguments do not justify the conclusion that the Constitution should 
be the only source of public policy.
Ngcobo J also made the weaker statement that public policy is “rooted” in 
the Constitution.147 He further accepted that public policy is informed by the 
necessity to do simple justice between man and man,148 notions of fairness and 
justice as well as ubuntu.149 He stated, with reference to cases that concerned 
the law of delict,150 that:
“Public policy imports the notions of fairness, justice and reasonableness. Public policy would pre-
clude the enforcement of a contractual term if its enforcement would be unjust or unfair. Public policy, 
it should be recalled “is the general sense of justice of the community, the boni mores, manifested in 
public opinion”.151
No reference was made to the Constitution in coming to these conclusions.
Sachs J was more cautious. When it comes to the relationship between 
public policy and the Constitution he merely referred to “public policy in 
our new constitutional dispensation”,152 “considerations of public policy in 
our constitutional era”,153 “public policy propelled by the letter and spirit of 
the Constitution”154 and public policy as “animated”155 or “infused”156 by the 
Constitution or constitutional values.157
These statements appear to be more balanced and realistic. So the 
Constitution clearly will be an important determinant of public policy. Public 
policy will be rooted in the Constitution. The clear text of the Constitution will 
assist courts in determining public policy. But public policy also embraces 
more than the Constitution and constitutional values. It will remain very dif-
ficult to determine what public policy is in a specific case, partly because it 
embraces more than just the Constitution and partly because constitutional 
values are often vague and conflicting.
146 Para 28  
147 Para 28  This terminology is also used in most of the cases to which Ngcobo J refers: Afrox Healthcare 
Bpk v Strydom 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA) para 18; Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA) para 91  See also the 
cautious approach in Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security (Centre for Applied Legal Studies 
Intervening) 2001 4 SA 938 (CC) paras 54-56  See further Bafana Finance Mabopane v Makwakwa 2006 
4 SA 581 (SCA) para 11 where it was mentioned that public policy was grounded in the Constitution, and 
Price Waterhouse Coopers Inc v National Potato Co-operative Ltd 2004 6 SA 66 (SCA) para 24 where 
the court stated that public policy was anchored in the Constitution  See Lubbe 2004 SALJ 399-400, 402 
where the writer speaks of the “Constitution and of other underlying principles”  See also text next to n 
133 above
148 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 51 with reference to Jajbhay v Cassim 1939 AD 537 544; 
Price Waterhouse Coopers Inc v National Potato Co-operative Ltd 2004 6 SA 66 (SCA) para 23; Sasfin 
(Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 1 SA 1 (A) 9F-G
149 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) paras 51, 52  See text next to n 188 below
150 Lorimar Productions Inc v Sterling Clothing Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd; Lorimar Productions Inc v OK 
Hyperama Ltd and Others; Lorimar Productions Inc v Dallas Restaurant 1981 3 SA 1129 (T) 1152-1153; 
Schultz v Butt 1986 3 SA 667 (A) 679B-E
151 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 73
152 Para 183
153 Para 123
154 Para 150
155 Paras 157, 185
156 Para 177
157 Contrast this with the rigid approach followed by the majority and Supreme Court of Appeal
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If public policy is more than an expression of constitutional rights and val-
ues, it may be contended that it is inappropriate to mediate the Constitution’s 
application to contracts through public policy. It may water down constitu-
tional rights and bring them down to the level of ordinary rights and values. 
However, this result can be avoided by prioritizing different values under 
the rubric of public policy. All principles of public policy ought not to be, 
and have never been, treated equally. As long as there is a conscious proc-
ess of prioritizing, there is no reason why courts cannot give effect to the 
constitutional importance of certain rights and values, even if they impact on 
contracts through public policy.158
The root cause of most of the problems regarding the role of public policy in 
the application of the Constitution lies in confusion about its nature. Ngcobo 
J’s reference to the legal convictions of the community seems problematic, as 
previous Supreme Court of Appeal judgments have been highly critical of this 
terminology in the context of contracts.159 Moreover, the statements quoted 
above regarding the nature of public policy stretch over a very wide range. At 
times it is suggested that public policy merely represents public opinion. If this 
were true, it would indeed be inappropriate to apply the Constitution through 
public policy. Yet it represents an over-simplified view of public policy. Public 
policy is not, or at least is not necessarily, a factual issue. It is a collection of 
general principles and more specific rules of contract law that are aimed at 
protecting the public and broader interest and values of society that is at most 
sensitive to public opinion.160
3  The application of section 34 to contracts
The right to have disputes resolved by a court is guaranteed in section 34 
of the Constitution. Cameron JA did not make any direct reference to section 
34 when he answered his first question regarding the extent to which the Bill 
of Rights applied to the contracting parties.161 He asked, in a separate section, 
whether the time limitation could be impugned for being inconsistent with 
section 34. He decided that the section could not be applied in this manner, 
as it did not deprive the insured of any pre-existing right. From the outset the 
right to claim indemnification was subject to a time limitation. The cases on 
which the insured relied when challenging the time limitation on the basis 
of section 34162 concerned statutory provisions that restricted access to the 
courts of the holders of pre-existing rights. They constituted statutory restric-
158 See also text next to nn 102-110 above
159 Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA) paras 22, 93
160 Van der Merwe et al Contract 192-194  Lubbe 2004 SALJ 399 describes public policy as a “black-letter” 
concept “which, along with more precisely delineated concepts and rules, [constitutes a component] of 
legal doctrine”  However, see his more cautious approach and especially his more restrictive use of the 
term “black letter”, although it is also important not to remove the elasticity of the concept 403-405, 417
161 See text next to n 61 above  Compare the application of s 27(1)(a) of the Constitution in Afrox Healthcare 
Bpk v Strydom 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA) paras 14-31 and see the comments of Lubbe 2004 SALJ 399, 413-
414
162 Mohlomi v Minister of Defence 1997 1 SA 124 (CC); Moise v Greater Germiston Transitional Council: 
Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development Intervening (Women’s Legal Centre as Amicus 
Curiae) 2001 4 SA 491 (CC)
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tions on delictual rights. In this case a contractual right was limited in the 
contract which granted the right.163 The judge observed that:
“This is not to sanctify contract. It is to recognize that rights differ in their nature and how they 
originate, and consequently in how they are enforced and protected. The question whether statutory 
abridgement of access to court to enforce an existing right is justifiable cannot be equated with the 
question whether an apparently freely concluded contractual term is constitutionally suspect”.164
It is not quite clear to what extent the judge thought all these issues – the 
nature and origin of the right, the nature and origin of the restriction and 
whether the right already existed when it was restricted – determined the 
application of section 34. It would make sense if, on his argument, section 34 
was excluded only where a contractual right is created subject to a contractual 
time limitation.165 Other matters should not be conclusive. Section 34 should 
apply where a contractual right is restricted by statute, where a statutory 
right is created subject to restrictions, a statutory right is later restricted by 
statute, or where a pre-existing right that was not contractual is restricted 
contractually.
However, Ngcobo J in the Constitutional Court called Cameron JA’s under-
standing of section 34 “narrow and formalistic”.166 Although he found that 
section 34 could not be applied directly to the contract, he correctly felt the need 
to answer Cameron JA’s contention, because he gave effect to section 34 in the 
context of public policy.167 He found that Cameron JA did not take sufficient 
account of the fact that the courts have traditionally opposed contractual provi-
sions that prevent the parties to a contract from having their disputes referred to 
a court of law168 and that the Constitution now bolsters this approach.169
Nevertheless, Ngcobo J did not regard the basic distinction between contrac-
tual and statutory restrictions as irrelevant. A conceptual difference exists
“… between a statute that introduces a limitation on the period within which a pre-existing right may 
be prosecuted and a contract that establishes rights and time periods within which those rights must 
be prosecuted”.170
163 Napier v Barkhuizen 2006 4 SA 1 (SCA) paras 17-27
164 Para 24
165 Bhana 2007 SALJ 272 observes that it is unlikely that the court also thought that s 34 would not apply to 
contractual restrictions of pre-existing rights  The constitutional provision has already been applied in 
the contractual cases of Bafana Finance Mabopane v Makwakwa 2006 4 SA 581 (SCA) and SA Bank of 
Athens Ltd v Van Zyl 2005 5 SA 93 (SCA)  It also may be asked whether the court would have followed a 
similar approach if it found that the parties were in an unequal bargaining position (see Bhana 2007 SALJ 
279)
166 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 54  See also Bhana 2007 SALJ 279, whose argument 
supporting this point is not entirely convincing  She further argues that the courts have in the past 
struck down restrictions on contractually created rights and mentions the striking down of certificates 
of  balance in cases such as Ex parte Minister of Justice: In re Nedbank Ltd v Abstein Distributors (Pty) 
Ltd 1995 3 SA 1 (A) as an example  This proposition is more convincing
167 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) 54  Moseneke DCJ (para 108) and Sachs J (para 181 read with 
185) accepted without much comment that s 34 applied through public policy  Langa CJ (para 186) made 
a similar point, although he cautioned that s 34 would not necessarily have to operate through public 
policy
168 See, for example, Nino Bonino v De Lange 1906 TS 120 123-124
169 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 54
170 Para 55  See in a different context the influential arguments of Scott “Summary Execution Clauses in 
Pledge and Perfecting Clauses in Notarial Bonds” 2002 THRHR 656, especially 657-659 and the reference 
in Bock v Duburoro Investments (Pty) Ltd 2004 2 SA 242 (SCA) para 15
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The mere fact that a contractual provision does not restrict the operation 
of a pre-existing right is not a trump card. It will not mean that section 34 
should no longer have any application in the situation. But in evaluating the 
acceptability of a time-limitation provision, this fact should be considered in 
conjunction with others.171 The distinction drawn by the Supreme Court of 
Appeal has two dimensions. A contract is normally not unilaterally imposed in 
the same sense as a statutory provision. This should itself play a role in deter-
mining whether a time limitation is consistent with section 34.172 Moreover, a 
distinction can be drawn between the contractual restriction of a pre-existing 
right and the creation of a restricted right. A contractual time-limitation that 
restricts a pre-existing right to bring a claim, irrespective of how that right 
is created, will conceivably be treated differently to a time-limitation that 
determines the limits of a right on its creation in the contract. This will be so, 
even if both limitations are created with the same amount of volition.
Ngcobo J evaluated the effect of section 34 against the backdrop of the 
requirement that a contract must not be against public policy. He carefully 
considered the import of this provision.173 It is fundamental to the stability of 
our constitutional order. It requires a fair resolution of disputes.174 However, 
the right is itself subject to limitation. Access to courts is often restricted 
in contracts or in legislation. There may be sound pragmatic reasons for 
restricting access. Delays in bringing claims protract disputes about rights 
and obligations. They make it difficult to adjudicate satisfactorily on disputes 
as witnesses may no longer be available and the memories of those who are 
available may have faded. Accordingly, time-limitation clauses should be 
tolerated as long as they do not impinge on reasonable or fair access to the 
courts. The Constitution did not create an absolute right in section 34. Where 
section 34 is applied directly it will be subject to the limitations clause in sec-
tion 36. The reasonable limitation of section 34 in the context of public policy 
would also “reflect public policy”.175
Ngcobo J therefore decided that the test put forward in the Mohlomi case,176 
in the context of a statutory restriction that affected access to the court to 
enforce a delictual right, could also be applied in determining whether a con-
tractual time-limitation on a contractual right was contrary to public policy. It 
had to be determined whether the holder of a right had “an initial opportunity 
to exercise the right that amounts, in all the circumstances … to a real and 
fair one”.177 Time limitations should not be judged according to hard and fast 
rules.178
171 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 55
172 A contractual provision should be treated more strictly and more like a statutory provision, the smaller 
the element of volition involved  See Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) paras 176, 180 and 6 2 3 
below on the role of bargaining power and the approach of Sachs J
173 See also the minority judgment of Sachs J para 143
174 Paras 31-34
175 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) paras 46-48
176 Paras 50-52 with reference to Mohlomi v Minister of Defence 1997 1 SA 124 (CC) para 12  See also 
Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 109 per Moseneke DCJ and the analysis in 6 2 below
177 Mohlomi v Minister of Defence 1997 1 SA 124 (CC) para 12
178 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) paras 50-51
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4  Public policy, section 34 and the general determination of 
fairness or reasonableness in the light of the Constitution
The exceptio doli generalis has been discarded from South African law and 
the requirement that contracting parties must act in good faith in their contrac-
tual relationship has been applied restrictively by South African courts.179 By 
the same token, public policy has gained prominence as a device for achieving 
fairness in the law of contract. Courts have accepted that unconscionable, 
unduly harsh or oppressive contractual provisions could be struck down for 
being against public policy.180
In evaluating public policy, Cameron JA in the Supreme Court of Appeal 
first considered whether the limitation was unfair, with reference to the foun-
dational constitutional principles of dignity, equality and the advancements of 
human rights and freedoms.181 This approach followed from the narrow role 
which he ascribed to section 34 and his restrictive view of the manner in which 
the Constitution impacts on public policy. Moreover, he did not regard proof 
of unfairness as sufficient. These three aspects have not survived scrutiny. 
The Constitutional Court gave wide sway to section 34, did not regard broader 
foundational values underlying the Constitution as the only determinant of 
public policy and emphasized the role of unfairness as such.182 Hence, it is 
difficult to draw broad conclusions from this part of Cameron JA’s judgment. 
However, the contention that the Constitution bolsters an attack on an unfair 
contract term, even without reference to a specific constitutional right such as 
section 34, is correct.
A contractual provision which gives a contracting party a right that will 
expire after a very short time clearly also effectively deprives him of a fair 
179 Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA); Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas 
1988 3 SA 580 (A); Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA); Christie The Law of Contract in South Africa 
5th ed (2006) 12-13, 15, 16-17; Hawthorne “Closing the Open Norms in the Law of Contract” 2004 
THRHR 294, 300-301; Lubbe 2004 SALJ 397-398; Pretorius 2003 THRHR 643-644; Van der Merwe et al 
Contract 317-324  See the further discussion of bona fides in the text next to nn 222, 355-356, 365 below  
On the possible role of the exceptio doli generalis after the Napier matter, see Glover “Lazarus in the 
Constitutional Court: an exhumation of the Exceptio Doli Generalis” 2007 SALJ 449
180 Christie The Law of Contract (2006) 16-18, 343ff; Van der Merwe et al Contract 218-220  Some of the 
major cases are: Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA) para 8; Botha (now Griessel) v 
Finanscredit (Pty) Ltd 1989 3 SA 773 (A) 782-783; Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA) para 32 where 
the court referred to “buitengewone onbillikheid” (“extraordinary unfairness”); Diners Club SA (Pty) Ltd 
v Singh 2004 3 SA 630 (D) 658; National Bank of SA Ltd v Bophuthatswana Consumer Affairs Council 
1995 2 SA 853 (BG) 871; Price Waterhouse Coopers Inc v National Potato Co-operative Ltd 2004 6 
SA 66 (SCA) para 24; Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 1 SA 1 (A) 14  In First National Bank of SA Ltd v 
Sphinx Fashions CC 1993 2 SA 721 (W) 725 the court relied on Sasfin and stressed that the inequity of 
a situation was apparent and that it was grossly exploitative  In Bafana Finance Mabopane v Makwakwa 
2006 4 SA 581 (SCA) para 21 the court found that a provision was offensive to one’s sense of justice and 
in Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Essop 1997 4 SA 569 (D) 575-576 the court spoke of unconscionability 
and a complete lack of elementary justice  See the minority judgment in Brummer v Gorfil Brothers 
Investments (Pty) Ltd 1999 2 SA 389 (SCA) 420  See further 6 below  See also Hawthorne 2004 THRHR 
294 on the state of public policy after the Afrox case; Lubbe 2004 SALJ 398, 401, 412, 417; Naude & Lubbe 
“Exemption clauses – a rethink occasioned by Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom” 2005 SALJ 441, 442  See 
also Pretorius 2003 THRHR 642 where it is stated that courts will only apply this doctrine in aberrational 
instances and that courts restrict its operation  See also the comparison of Bhana 2007 SALJ 275 of this 
approach with the one followed by Cameron JA in Napier (n 206 below)
181 Napier v Barhuizen 2006 (4) SA 1 (SCA) paras 6-16
182 See 3 above on the wide reading of s 34, 2 3 above on the broader approach to public policy, and text next 
to fn 148 on the enhanced importance of fairness
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opportunity to enforce it. Insurance contracts also typically determine that an 
insured must give notice of a loss within a specific time of that loss coming to 
his knowledge.183 If this period is short, say 24 hours, could it not be argued 
that the insured is deprived of his right to claim indemnification in court? The 
answer seems to be no. The notice requirement in Napier was related more 
closely to the bringing of court proceedings. Similarly, such a notice provision 
is different from the statutory provision set out in section 113 of the Defence 
Act 44 of 1957 which was struck down in the Mohlomi case184 for being incon-
sistent with section 34 of the Constitution. That provision determined that:
“No civil action shall be capable of being instituted against the State or any person in respect of 
anything done or omitted to be done in pursuance of this Act, if a period of six months … has elapsed 
since the date on which the cause of action arose, and notice in writing of any such civil action and 
of the cause thereof shall be given to the defendant one month at least before the commencement 
thereof.”
The notice requirement in terms of the statute also was related more closely 
to civil action. Access rights in terms of section 34 will come into play only 
where a contractual provision is closely related to court access. (In this sense 
the typical short-term insurance provision stating that an insured will only 
pay a claim within one year of loss suffered by the insured, unless the claim 
is the subject of legal proceedings at the end of the period, is more likely also 
to be subject to scrutiny in terms of section 34185). However, such a provision 
can still be inconsistent with public policy on the basis that it is generally 
unconscionable, even if not specifically inconsistent with section 34.
Indeed, the right of access to the courts, unlike the right to be fairly treated 
in contracts in the more general sense, is specifically guaranteed in the 
Constitution. This suggests that it should receive special attention. Some dis-
tinction therefore has to be drawn between cases that concern unreasonable 
limits to court access and other unreasonable provisions. One of the strengths 
of the minority judgment of Sachs J is that he did so throughout.186 In this sense 
the attempt of the Supreme Court of Appeal to draw a line and to evaluate the 
time limitation against a general reasonableness standard is understandable. 
Nevertheless, it is suggested that the rigid bright line cannot be drawn in the 
form and at the place suggested by the Supreme Court of Appeal.187
Conversely, the question whether a provision is fair or reasonable in the 
more general sense, and whether it gives a person a fair or reasonable oppor-
tunity to have access to a court with regard to a specific right, are closely 
related. This broader link should not be ignored. Ngcobo J’s judgment should 
183 Reinecke et al General Principles of Insurance Law para 317  See especially Burochowitz J in Napier NO 
v Van Schalkwyk 2004 3 SA 425 (W) and the proposed solutions to the problem  Perhaps enforcement of 
these types of provisions should depend on whether the insurer suffers prejudice  See also the comment 
about public policy by Farber J in the same case (435)
184 Mohlomi v Minister of Defence 1997 1 SA 124 (CC)
185 K & S Dry Cleaning Equipment (Pty) Ltd v SA Eagle Insurance Co Ltd 2001 3 SA 652 (W); Kgaka 
v Statsure Insurance Co Ltd 2001 4 SA 245 (T); Metcash Trading Ltd v Credit Guarantee Insurance 
Corporation of Africa Ltd 2004 5 SA 520 (SCA); Union National South British Insurance Co Ltd v 
Padayachee 1985 1 SA 551 (A)
186 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) paras 123, 143, 150, 181, 183, 185  See 6 2 4 below
187 See 3 above
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not be read as concerning only the section 34 right of access to the courts, but 
also the role of reasonableness and fairness as a general informing principle 
of public policy:
“Notions of fairness, justice and equity, and reasonableness cannot be separated from public policy. 
Public policy takes into account simple justice between individuals. Public policy is informed by the 
concept of ubuntu.” 188
The requirement that a time limitation has to give a fair opportunity to 
seek judicial redress to a contracting party was viewed as being “con sistent 
with the notions of fairness and justice which inform public policy”. 189 In 
terms of public policy, fair access to the courts is therefore viewed as a spe-
cific manifestation of a broader concept of fairness. The conclusion that an 
unfair contractual provision could be against public policy as informed by the 
Constitution therefore extended beyond provisions that restrict access to the 
courts.190
A similar approach was followed in the minority judgments. Moseneke 
DCJ noted that it had to be determined whether the contractual term is so 
unreasonable that it offends public policy. “In the context of this case” the 
question was whether it unreasonably restricted the right to seek judicial 
redress.191 Sachs J ultimately left open the question whether all oppressive 
standard-form contractual terms will be offensive to public policy. He found 
only that the oppressive time limitation before him was inconsistent with pub-
lic policy because it concerned the constitutionally protected right of access 
to the courts.192 yet, almost his entire judgment was dedicated to an analysis 
of standard-form contracts and the extent to which oppressive provisions in 
these contracts will be contrary to public policy. He established a clear link 
between time limitations, unfair terms in standard-form contracts and unfair 
terms more generally.193
[To be continued in 2009 (1) Stellenbosch Law Review]
Summary
Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) has important implications for insurance law, contract 
law in general, and an understanding of the interface between private common law and the Bill of 
Rights. In this matter an insurance policy determined that a claim against the insurer would lapse if 
the insured failed to serve summons on the insurer within 90 days of being notified of the insurer’s 
repudiation of the claim. The insured argued that this provision conflicted with the constitutional right 
of access to the courts set out in section 34 of the Bill of Rights
The majority of the Constitutional Court, per Ngcobo J, considered the application of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 in private relationships. He eschewed direct appli-
cation of the Bill of Rights to the contractual provision, but preferred to apply it indirectly via the 
contract law concept of public policy. He considered the meaning of this form of public policy in the 
light of the Constitution, determined the manner in which the section 34 right as an expression of 
188 Para 51  See again the reference to “simple justice between the contracting parties” in para 73 and the 
reference to “simple justice between person and person” per Sachs J in para 159  See also text next to n 
149 above
189 Para 52
190 For a similar approach to enforcement, see paras 70, 73  
191 Para 96
192 Para 185
193 Paras 158-161, especially paras 161, 174, 175
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public policy applied to this contract and related this to broader contractual fairness. Part I of this 
article focuses on these aspects.
The majority further considered the significance of the sanctity of contract under the Constitution 
and decided that it could only uphold the time-limitation clause if it was fair. Its test for determining 
fairness was derived from cases that determined whether statutory provisions were inconsistent with 
section 34. The majority upheld the clause on the basis that there was insufficient evidence to show 
that the provision was unreasonable or that it would be unreasonable to enforce it in the circumstances. 
Part II, which is to be published in 2009 (1) Stellenbosch Law Review, is dedicated to an analysis of 
these issues.
The majority judgment is analyzed with reference to the trenchant criticism in the minority judg-
ments of Sachs J and Moseneke DCJ, delivered in the same court, as well as the earlier judgments of 
the Transvaal Provincial Decision and Supreme Court of Appeal. Ultimately the majority judgment in 
the Constitutional Court is criticized for being too timid and in some respects unsystematic. However, 
the final conclusion is positive. These judgments can serve as a springboard for the development of a 
progressive contract law, built on the values and rights set out in the Constitution.
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